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Abstract 
Innovation policy is in need for a rational which allows the design and evaluation of 
policy instruments. In economic policy traditionally the focus is on market failures and 
efficiency measures are used to decide whether policy should intervene and which 
instrument should be applied. In innovation policy this rational cannot meaningfully 
be applied because of the uncertain and open character of innovation processes. 
Uncertainty is not a market failure and cannot be repaired. Inevitably policy makers 
are subject to failure and their goals are to be considered as much more modest 
compared to the achievement of a social optimum. Instead of optimal innovation, the 
avoidance of evolutionary inefficiencies becomes the centrepiece of innovation policy 
making. Superimposed to the several sources of evolutionary inefficiencies are so-
called network inefficiencies. Because of the widespread organisation of innovation in 
innovation networks, the network structures and dynamics give useful hints for 
innovation policy, where and when to intervene. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Today innovation networks, innovation clusters and innovation systems are an 
integral part of innovation policies worldwide (e.g. EU Commission 2008, OECD 
2009, World Bank 2010) which enjoy an increasing popularity in practical innovation 
policies since more than 20 years. Although frequently applied in practice, from a 
theoretical point of view, the effects of innovation networks are still debatable. The 
reason for these difficulties of theoretically integrating knowledge exchange in 
networks and deviating policy conclusions focusing on network structures are to be 
seen in the theoretical body of mainstream economics, which considers innovation as 
a part of normal economic activities and decision-making following the idea of 
optimization. For economic policy making this calls for a policy rationale allowing for 
the evaluation of innovation network policies within the standard efficiency-oriented 
framework.  
 
Since the 1990s the idea of Innovation Systems (IS) has become very prominent in 
modern innovation economics and innovation policy. The proponents of innovation 
systems underline that the neoclassical market failure approach can be dismissed to 
justify technology policy. Instead, the variety of institutions and actors that are 
involved in innovation and the resulting complex interactions among them give room 
for technology policy without referring to market failures in order to justify the non-
market parts of the system (Nelson, 2009). This switch from the neoclassical to the 
systemic evolutionary view opens up new possibilities of envisaging policies 
focussing on innovation and in particular on innovation networks within a theoretical 
framework in which innovation processes are considered as collective learning, 
experimenting and problem-solving processes. 
 
The innovation systems literature developed a comparative institutional approach on 
the level of National Innovation Systems (NIS) (Freeman, 1987, Lundvall, 1992, 
Nelson, 1993), on the level of Sectoral Innovation Systems (SIS) (Malerba 2004) and 
on the level of Regional Innovation Systems (RIS) (Cooke and Morgan, 1998). An 
important common ingredient of these innovation system approaches is the rejection 
of the linear view of innovation processes in favour of the systemic view (e.g. the 
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chain-linked model of Kline and Rosenberg, 1986) where the functional as well as 
dysfunctional and bi-directional relations between the various phases of the 
innovation process and the different actors involved are crucial. The major message 
of the systemic view is to understand that new knowledge does not spillover 
automatically among the different actors involved in innovation processes. To 
understand the knowledge creation and diffusion processes on the national, the 
regional as well as the sectoral level one has to understand that the various actors 
(which besides commercial firms explicitly encompass all other actors that are 
involved in the innovation process) are interlinked in innovation networks.  
 
Most basically, innovation networks consist of actors and linkages among these 
actors (for a general overview on economic theories of innovation networks see Pyka 
(2002); in Buchmann and Pyka (2011) a survey on the recent literature on innovation 
networks can be found). The idea of actors is conceived very broadly and 
encompasses besides firms, individuals, research institutes and university 
laboratories also venture capital firms and standardization agencies. Links among the 
actors are used as channels for knowledge and information flows as well as financial 
flows as in the case of venture capitalists. The links among actors can either be 
formal (R&D joint ventures, strategic alliances, research consortia etc.) or informal, 
based on personal contacts and recommendation. In essence, innovation networks 
provide the networking actors with knowledge that might be complementary to their 
own knowledge as well as with other resources necessary to run an enterprise and to 
survive in innovation competition. Accordingly, innovation networks are a means for 
the industrial organization of research and development, which is particularly relevant 
in knowledge-intensive industries with high requirements concerning the 
competences of involved actors, e.g. fast development of new knowledge, design of 
interfaces between different (modular) technologies, combinatorial (complex) 
innovation etc. 
 
The establishment, manipulation and governance of innovation networks therefore 
are considered to be appropriate contact points for an innovation policy aiming to 
create prolific conditions for a dynamic innovation-driven economic development. 
From this the question arises how the network-based innovation policies are to be 
designed and evaluated. The aim of this paper is to develop a framework which 
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justifies policy interventions from a dynamic network-based angle. This framework 
will allow for a rationale for innovation policy in general and highlight the role of 
innovation networks in particular.  
 
In the following section, the efficiency-oriented neoclassical approach is analyzed on 
its applicability for this purpose. It turns out that severe problems arise if innovation 
processes are considered as true uncertain processes, which is constitutive in the 
systemic and evolutionary view. In the third section dealing with knowledge-
generation and -diffusion processes, the prerequisites of a future-oriented economic 
development are identified. These processes are threatened by several evolutionary 
inefficiencies which substitute the idea of an efficient innovation processes underlying 
the neoclassical rational and offer a new target for innovation policies. In section 4 
the concept of evolutionary inefficiencies and their avoidance are used to derive 
guidelines for an innovation policy design focussing on innovation networks.   
 
2. “Repairing Market Failures” - the Rational for Innovation Policy?  
 
Economic policy in general aims at the manipulation of structures in order to provide 
the prerequisites for an improved allocation of resources and allowing for a 
prosperous future-oriented economic development. Within the mainstream 
neoclassical framework, a widely accepted benchmark for policy interventions is the 
so-called social optimum, the reference case which is achieved in an economic 
system by a benevolent social planner who considers the individual welfares of all 
market participants (e.g. Arrow, 1951). Due to substantial rational individuals the 
market participants automatically realize the welfare optimum in a static setting. And 
due to perfect foresight the market participants are also able to realize an inter-
temporal welfare optimum because they take into account all future impacts of their 
economic decisions.  
 
However, for such social optima to be realized a number of prerequisites are to be 
fulfilled which in reality are not guaranteed and which are responsible for so-called 
market failures. Therefore, policy interventions are considered as correctives which 
restore optimal individual incentives for economic decision making in order to achieve 
the social optimal outcome as suggested by the benchmark. 
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Does this normative policy concept also work in the case of innovation policy? And 
why is innovation policy an important application of economic policy and therefore 
subject to economic considerations? To answer the latter question first: 
Technological change and more general innovations are considered to be the 
decisive factors determining economic growth (Solow, 1956, 1957). For this reason, 
latest since the 1950s, the attention of economic policy encompasses also innovation 
processes. As deficiencies or market failures incomplete incentives of market 
participants to be engaged in innovation are detected on a static level. Because of 
free-rider problems which stem from imperfect appropriability conditions of new 
technological knowledge, the individual incentives to invest in research and 
development (R&D) are below the social optimal incentives (Arrow, 1959). In this 
case the guideline for innovation policy says: Restore the individual incentives until 
the marginal return of R&D equals the marginal costs of R&D (e.g. by R&D 
subsidies). The dynamic goal of innovation policy foresees an economy to grow 
along its equilibrium trajectory and to achieve the maximum growth by inter-temporal 
cost-minimization. Transitions from one technology to another (i.e. structural change) 
are smooth processes taking into account e.g. the vintages of production 
technologies and their requirements for an adjusted depreciation or the adjustments 
of the educational infrastructures in order to create the required human capital. Like 
in the static case, the installation of new technologies is easily done due to the fully 
developed competences of market participants. Innovation policy is intervening only 
when achieving this cost-minimizing path is endangered by e.g. sunk costs which 
make a retreat from obsolete markets difficult (e.g. tax policies) or frictional problems 
due to the required shift in human capital (e.g. educational policy). 
 
To design and to evaluate innovation policy instruments in this vein, the costs of 
innovation policies are to be confronted with the rewards of the innovation policies. 
For this purpose, cost-benefit considerations are applied which provide for several 
efficiency measures. In general, these efficiency measures set in relation the amount 
of resources which are to be invested in order to achieve a certain outcome. As the 
outcome is (well) defined by the social welfare optimum, the policy instrument is 
chosen that allows for achieving this goal with a minimum requirement of resources. 
Innovation policies focussing on the optimal incentives to invest in R&D are evaluated 
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according to a static efficiency concept relating the costs of the policy intervention 
(i.e. the input of innovation policy) to the achievement of the optimal incentive level 
(i.e. output of innovation policy). Various instruments (e.g. R&D subsidies, R&D tax 
credits, institutional adjustments like e.g. patents) are then compared and the most 
efficient one i.e. the one with the best cost-benefit relation is chosen. In a similar way 
the dynamic efficiency concept is applied by relating the costs of policy instruments 
with the given goal of achieving the well known and ex-ante specified inter-temporal 
cost-minimizing path.  
 
To summarize: In neoclassical welfare economics innovation policies are treated 
similar to any other kind of economic policies: Within its particular set of assumptions 
(substantial rationality and equilibrium) market failures are repaired. The task for 
policy makers is to restore the optimal incentives for an efficient allocation of 
resources in a static and a dynamic perspective. Due to well-defined economic 
decision problems the choice of policy instruments follows standard efficiency 
considerations. 
 
Beginning latest in the mid of the 1970s the neoclassical framework was criticized of 
being not suited for the analysis of innovation processes and their impact on 
economic development. The proponents of this fundamental critic refer to the ideas of 
Joseph Alois Schumpeter (1912) who conceived innovations as the force which 
endogenously destroy the circular flow (i.e. economic equilibrium). The central point 
of this upcoming criticism focuses on the assumption of substantial rationality which 
completely is in conflict with the very nature of innovation processes, namely true 
uncertainty (Knight, 1921). Innovations are characterized by true uncertainty which 
cannot be approximated by probability distributions over a known state space. In 
other words: If an innovation would have been known ex-ante, it would not have been 
an innovation. Instead, the state space itself is unexpectedly modified by its 
innovative extension. Accordingly, the application of optimization calculus, even in 
the form of the maximization of expected values, is no longer possible. Erdmann 
(1993) coined the notion of pathological pessimism of neoclassical economics with 
respect to innovation because a homo oeconomicus would always prefer an 
extremely small pay-off against a true uncertain pay-off of an innovation, how large it 
ever might be.  
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Consequently, if true uncertainty is considered to be a constitutive feature of 
innovation, the concept of substantial rationality is misleading and counterfactual as 
innovation processes would no longer take place. If innovation processes are treated 
realistically, they are no longer to be envisaged as optimization processes. This 
fundamental disability to integrate innovation processes into the standard economics 
program leads to the emergence of an understanding of economic development 
driven by innovation as a cultural evolutionary process (Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
Innovation processes are now considered as complex experimental processes with a 
high probability of failure, or more generally, innovation processes become trial-and-
error processes where learning and acquiring of competences of economic actors are 
central. Instead of substantial rationality the concept of a procedural rationality 
(Simon, 1976) has to be applied which offers scope for learning and imperfect 
knowledge bases of economic actors. 
 
3. Consequences for Innovation Policy – the lost Benchmark  
 
This consideration of true uncertainty has strong implications for innovation policy. 
Uncertainty is qualitatively very different from market failures which are central in the 
neoclassical justification of innovation policies designed to repair market 
imperfections. Uncertainty instead is a condition-sine-qua-non of innovation 
processes and cannot be repaired. On the contrary, also the social planner is 
confronted with uncertainty and therefore comes with incomplete knowledge on 
future developments and a high probability to fail with his interventions in innovation 
processes.  
 
For innovation policy the consideration of true uncertainty has the painful 
consequence that the benchmark of a social optimum is inevitably lost. And related, 
also the efficiency concepts in their traditional interpretation are no longer applicable 
to design and to evaluate innovation policies. Economic evolution in principle is an 
open process which does not follow an ex-ante given and well specified goal. In 
Dosi’s (1988) words: “Almost by definition, what is searched for cannot be known ex-
ante with any precision before the activity itself …, so that the technical (and, even 
more so, the commercial) outcomes of innovative efforts can hardly be known ex-
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ante.” In innovation processes failure and inefficiencies have to be accepted to be on 
the order of the day (Metcalfe, 1994). Of course, in some situations better 
prerequisites for economic development can be identified than in some other 
situations. The goals for an innovation policy then only can be to identify and support 
prolific conditions for innovation processes and to avoid bottlenecks for a future-
oriented economic development. The epistemological caveat of true uncertainty is 
always present and relativizes every ex-ante selection. Instead of focussing on well 
specified goals, innovation policy has to focus on the innovation process in its own.  
 
For the design and the evaluation of innovation policy instruments follows: If 
economic development driven by innovation is considered as an evolutionary 
process, efficiency concepts are no longer applicable because no well specified goal 
can be derived ex-ante. Instead, and much more modestly, innovation policy has to 
be designed and evaluated according to the ability to avoid evolutionary inefficiencies 
whenever possible. As evolutionary inefficiencies we define situations which clearly 
restrict potentials for future development. 
 
3.1 Prerequisites of a Future-Oriented Economic Development: Knowledge 
Generation and Diffusion 
 
What are the prerequisites of a future-oriented economic development which give a 
hint on possible interventions of innovation policy? For sustainable innovation 
processes the origination of knowledge is decisive: The appearance and application 
of new knowledge stands behind the intentional introduction of all kinds of novelties. 
Therefore, knowledge generation and diffusion processes move into the centre of 
interest of innovation policy. 
 
Basically new knowledge originates in two different ways: (i) In the tradition of Adam 
Smith’s (1776) emphasis on division of labour and specialisation, a first stream in the 
literature focuses on the need of concentration on a narrow subset of knowledge in 
order to excel. (ii) Rather contrary, in modern innovation economics learning from 
diverse knowledge bases is considered to be an equally important source of new 
knowledge. The re-combination of heterogeneous knowledge-bases continuously 
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leads to new knowledge (Simon 1985). Accordingly, the larger the diverse knowledge 
pool in an economy is, the better are the prospects for innovation.  
 
Within modern management theories this tensioned relationship between the variety 
of knowledge fields and specialisation within single knowledge fields has become 
famous under the heading exploration vs. exploitation (Cyert and March, 1963). 
Exploration includes the discovery of new techno-economic opportunities, thereby 
increasing knowledge variety. For this purpose the whole space of opportunities is 
screened for new promising alternatives. Exploitation instead focuses on the 
advancement in a well defined technological area. In other words, exploitation deals 
with the achievement of a high degree of sophistication which can only be reached 
by specialization.  
 
Both knowledge generation mechanisms in isolation will not allow for a sustainable 
generation of new knowledge. Exploration only, i.e. the discovery of new 
technological opportunities, is not sufficient for economic development, because 
without advancing and excelling in the new technologies, the economic rewards will 
not be realized. Exploitation only, i.e. the mastering and improvement of a new 
technology, also is not sufficient for a sustainable innovation process, as the techno-
economic opportunities of a given technology are only limited and technological 
opportunities will sooner or later be exhausted. As a consequence the innovation 
process and with it the economic development will come to a rest (Coombs, 1988, 
Dosi, 1982).  
 
These considerations on the firm level also hold on the economic level: For economic 
growth, Saviotti and Pyka (2004) show that for the structural transformation of 
economies indeed increasing productivity in a single technology (i.e. industry) and 
the emergence of new industries are to be considered as complementary for 
economic development. By increasing the productivity in older industries, an 
economy earns the resources which are necessary to discover new techno-economic 
opportunities which again are necessary for the emergence of new industries. 
Without the search for new techno-economic opportunities the economy will end up 
in stagnation; without increasing the productivity in existing industries, the economy 
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will run short of resources which are to be invested in the search for new techno-
economic opportunities. 
 
Therefore, the question to focus on exploration or exploitation opens up an important 
dynamic dimension in the evolution of knowledge and economic development (e.g. 
the cycle of discovery, Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2006). In the course of an industry 
life cycle the answer on which activity to focus on, will turn out differently. In the 
opening phase of a new industry, innovation-driven entrepreneurial entry usually is 
combined with the exploratory search for promising technological trajectories with a 
positive effect on knowledge variety and the creation of niche markets. In more 
mature stages of an industry life cycle, however, the research and development 
activities become focused on the exploitation of specific opportunities in order to 
improve competitiveness. This leads to a decreasing variety of knowledge fields and 
to a strong accumulation of specialized knowledge. The knowledge base of the 
industry under consideration necessarily locks-in to a rather small subset of 
knowledge fields. In this sense, evolution consumes its own fuel, as variety is 
decreasing with the advancement along certain technological trajectories (Metcalfe, 
1995). Without a replenishment of the knowledge base through e.g. basic research 
activities and the entrepreneurially implementation of the new knowledge, the 
economic development runs the risk of coming to a halt. 
 
A further obstacle for knowledge evolution and the related innovation-driven 
economic development has to be seen in a potential lack of diffusion of the new 
knowledge in the population of firms. Obviously, without a wide diffusion of the new 
knowledge, innovation will be an insular phenomenon without any macroeconomic 
effects on income per capita, productivity and economic growth. Sources of this lack 
of diffusion are to be searched again in dependence of the exploratory and 
exploitative phases of knowledge generation. In the exploratory phase knowledge 
diffusion might be constrained by a malfunctioning knowledge transfer between 
actors and institutions engaged in basic research and the population of firms. A 
similar negative effect on the diffusion of new explorative knowledge stems from an 
underdeveloped entrepreneurial activity caused by lacking venture capital or by a 
missing future orientation of an education policy which not early enough manage to 
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move into the new fields in order to provide the competences required by the 
companies (Hanusch and Pyka, 2007).  
 
Also in the exploitative phase of knowledge generation the diffusion can be strongly 
restricted by missing links among the firms in an industry. Today’s technological 
solutions are most often characterized by a high degree of complexity which means 
that the variety of different knowledge fields which are relevant for a new technology 
is considerably large. Teece (1988) coined the notion of combinatorial innovation in 
this context. This means that hardly any firm is able to master all technological areas 
which are relevant for a new technology, not to mention to push ahead the 
development of the respective knowledge fields. Without a dense network of linkages 
with other actors engaged in the innovation process, the knowledge cannot diffuse 
widely and rapidly enough to unfold its positive impacts in an economy. 
 
To summarize: the following four issues are identified as necessary conditions for an 
innovation-driven economic development: (i) Exploration of new techno-economic 
opportunities in order to increase the variety of knowledge fields. (ii) Exploitation of 
techno-economic opportunities to realize the economic benefits of innovation 
processes. (iii) Mastering the dynamic trade-off between exploration and exploitation 
activities in order to provide for a rich variety of knowledge assets in the long run and 
simultaneously excel in a small subset of knowledge fields in the short run. From a 
dynamic perspective, the economic system has to balance an adequate mix of 
explorative activities, where new techno-economic opportunities are discovered, and 
exploitative activities, which foster economic growth and income development. (iv) 
For the knowledge generation and diffusion processes to work adequately and to 
unfold the beneficial effects for an economy, the relevant actors are to be interlinked, 
so that the knowledge can travel among the various agents and the various phases 
of the innovation process and thereby get improved and increasingly applied. 
 
3.2 Evolutionary Inefficiencies  
 
Each of these four prerequisites is endangered to be not fulfilled and to jeopardize 
innovation-driven economic development. Accordingly, four different sources of 
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evolutionary inefficiencies can be derived: (i) exploration inefficiencies, (ii) 
exploitation inefficiencies, (iii) balance inefficiencies and (iv) network inefficiencies. 
 
(i) A situation where exploration inefficiencies hinder economic development can be 
detected when the prevailing research orientation in an economy is biased towards 
an applied orientation. Sooner or later the intensive technological opportunities 
(Coombs, 1988), i.e. the specific opportunities of a certain technology are depleted 
and technological progress considerably slows down or improvements of a similar 
magnitude become increasingly expensive because of missing extensive 
opportunities (Coombs, 1988), i.e. the opportunities which arise from cross-
fertilization with other technologies. A similar negative effect for economic 
development can be traced back to an underdeveloped attitude to found new 
companies in the economy or by administrative hurdles hindering entrepreneurial 
activities. Without start-up companies which advance new knowledge into 
innovations, the transfer of knowledge from basic to applied research is considerably 
hindered. 
 
(ii) Whereas exploration inefficiencies can be found in situations where the economic 
actors are none the less intensively engaged in R&D, exploitation inefficiencies are 
caused by a too low research intensity. The missing research activities of firms can 
be traced back to either a missing awareness of the companies that they are 
confronted with innovation competition, e.g. not-invented-here-syndrome (Katz and 
Allen, 1982) or missing absorptive capacities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). Yet 
another reason might be a shortage of adequate competences in the labour force, 
which restricts access to the new technologies. Without a sufficient level of R&D as 
well as by a mismatch of the competencies available and requested on the labour 
market, the accumulation of relevant knowledge in new industries very likely is too 
slow and cannot trigger the innovation dynamics necessary to survive in the global 
competition for new industries. 
 
(iii) Although the fast accumulation of knowledge is a prerequisite for new industries 
to develop, it bears a significant danger concerning long-run developmental 
potentials. A too early concentration on a particular set of knowledge (i.e. 
exploitation) excludes promising alternative fields of knowledge and might lead to 
 13
lock-in effects which in a dynamic perspective drastically reduce the possibilities of 
development. In consequence, not all promising alternatives are followed up and 
significant techno-economic opportunities are not explored. These balance 
inefficiencies stem from a patchy mixture of exploration and exploitation activities 
which lead to a too early rejection of promising new knowledge. Simultaneously, the 
economic actors do not get rid of exhausted techno-economic opportunities in time 
and stay for too long in the previous successful technologies (Eliasson, 1991). 
 
Quite opposite, balance inefficiencies might also be caused by a too high variety of 
competing knowledge fields when a new industry has to move into the exploitation 
stage. Without the development of a dominant design (Abernathy and Utterback, 
1975), the agreement of interfaces which allow for complementarities among different 
technologies and industrial norms, new industries run into trouble in their early 
periods. Without reaching a certain size of the industry, the new technologies cannot 
diffuse as rapidly and widely as it would be necessary in order to exert an economic 
impact.  
 
(iv) Network inefficiencies, finally, stem from missing and/or malfunctioning links 
among economic actors participating in innovation processes. Network inefficiencies 
in the sense of missing links among actors hamper the diffusion of new knowledge 
and hinder the discovery of cross-fertilization opportunities among seemingly 
disconnected knowledge fields. But not only missing links cause network 
inefficiencies. They might also be caused by too large networks which imply too high 
coordination efforts or by an imbalance of linkages among actors which opens up 
possibilities for strategic control of knowledge flows within the innovation networks 
(e.g. gatekeepers and structural holes, Burt, 1992, Ahuja, 2000), or by decreasing 
network dynamics which exclude actors with dissimilar knowledge. In these cases not 
only the sheer existence of linkages among actors is relevant for innovation policy but 
also their distribution as well as their qualitative features. 
 
Network inefficiencies are to be considered as a general concept which is 
superimposed to the other inefficiency concepts. Due to the complex nature of 
modern innovation processes the knowledge required for successful innovations is 
dispersed and the relevant actors do have to exchange and combine the knowledge 
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in networks in order to successfully innovate. Innovation processes organised in 
innovation networks therefore shift the attention of innovation policy to the network 
inefficiencies. The following interactions between network inefficiencies and the other 
evolutionary inefficiency concepts are possible: 
 
Concerning the exploration inefficiencies, not only a missing basic research 
orientation of economic actors can be made responsible for exhausted economic 
growth potentials, but also missing links among universities and other basic research-
oriented institutions and applied research-oriented firms. Without being embedded in 
suited network structures which connect these different groups of actors, the 
necessary knowledge transfers fail to appear. New achievements in basic research 
literally stay disconnected and never reach the applied dimension with strong 
negative effects on long-run innovation performance.  
 
However, strong and encompassing innovation networks might cause exploitation 
inefficiencies. This is the case of malfunctioning network ties which hinder the 
discovery of novelties and the creation of new techno-economic niches. The 
organization of industrial R&D in innovation networks runs danger of a knowledge 
selection within the innovation network which repeats the Not-Invented-Here-
Syndrome on the network level.  
 
From this also follows that network inefficiencies can appear together and aggravate 
the balance inefficiencies by supporting the emergence of lock-in effects, thereby 
excluding promising alternatives at a too early stage. In cases where the entry into 
innovation networks is blocked or potential members are excluded because of an 
assumed incompatibility of their knowledge base, the knowledge of the members of 
the innovation network increasingly aligns and makes novel combinations within the 
innovation network less likely.  
 
However, and contrary, if the balance inefficiencies are caused by missing norms and 
standards, the negative effects on industrial evolution are aggravated by missing 
links among actors. As innovation networks offer the channels for communication and 
knowledge transfer, they are considered to be the ideal organizational form for the 
development of common standards and norms necessary to spur industrial 
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development in the transition between the explorative and the exploitative phase of 
industrial evolution. 
 
The evolutionary inefficiencies discussed in this section threaten economic 
development (Pelikan, 2003): Economic development might be blocked because of 
lock-ins into inferior technologies (exploration inefficiencies). Also, excessively 
wasteful developments due to the inability of the economic system to trigger sufficient 
industrial dynamics might restrict prolific economic development (exploitation 
inefficiencies). Finally, economic development can become misdirected because of a 
wrong balance between the exploration and the exploitation orientation (balance 
inefficiencies). Because of the outstanding role innovation networks play in complex 
innovation processes, network inefficiencies are clearly superimposed to these 
evolutionary inefficiencies and therefore offer promising starting points for innovation 
policies. 
 
4. Innovation Policy and Innovation Networks 
 
The consideration of true uncertainty in innovation processes unpleasantly implicates 
the loss of a benchmark which might have offered a point of reference for the design 
of innovation policies. What remains instead of a goal-orientation in innovation policy, 
i.e. the achievement of ex-ante well specified situations, is a process-orientation, i.e. 
taking care of prolific conditions for an innovation-driven economic development. This 
process-oriented view, which is in line with the systemic and evolutionary approaches 
in innovation economics, advises a rationale for innovation policy which focuses on 
the avoidance of bottlenecks for economic development, i.e. evolutionary 
inefficiencies.  
 
As uncertainty in innovation is ubiquitous, also policy makers cannot escape it and 
therefore permanently run the risk of failure in their attempts to manipulate innovation 
processes. Focussing on well-specified technological goals in a mission-oriented 
policy design (Ergas, 1987, Cantner and Pyka, 2001) inevitably provokes misdirected 
developments. Although failure per se cannot be excluded, the risk to waste public 
money is considerably smaller when the focus of innovation policy is on knowledge 
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generation and diffusion i.e. follows a diffusion-oriented design (Ergas, 1987, Cantner 
and Pyka, 2001).  
 
In the efforts to govern innovation processes useful hints for the design of innovation 
policies can be found in the structures and dynamics of the underlying innovation 
networks. The complex and combinatorial nature of innovation catapults innovation 
networks into the centre of alertness of innovation policy: first, innovation networks 
are a widely spread organisational form for innovation processes and second, 
network inefficiencies are superimposed to the other evolutionary efficiencies and 
therefore can be considered as the entrance point for endeavours to manipulate 
innovation processes.  
 
In general, innovation networks offer a flexible environment for innovation processes 
by horizontally and vertically interlinking the involved actors. The linkages in the 
networks can be considered as channels for knowledge transfer that are essential in 
complex innovation processes where different fields of knowledge are relevant and 
the actors are specialised in a small subset of knowledge fields only, namely their 
core competencies. Vertically, innovation networks connect the different steps in the 
value chains (resource industries, investment good industries, producers and 
customers) as well as the different phases of innovation processes (i.e. basic- and 
applied-oriented research). Horizontally, in innovation networks the actors within 
industries are connected to exchange knowledge, mutually learn, develop standards 
and norms and advance the underlying technologies. Although one could principally 
expect these innovation networks to emerge and to develop in a self-organisational 
way, obstacles in their emergence, misguided developments and malfunctioning links 
cannot be excluded (e.g. Pyka and Windrum, 2003).  
 
This is where the network inefficiencies enter as a target for policy intervention. The 
creation, the growth and the closure of innovation networks can be influenced by 
innovation policy instruments. Policy can offer incentives to enter into R&D 
collaborations which then serve as a kernel for network evolution. Also, policy 
programs can be implemented which focus on knowledge transfer between basic and 
applied research by strengthening university-industry-linkages. Public actors 
themselves can enter innovation networks and play important roles as network 
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facilitators, network triggers etc. by inviting other actors to join the innovation 
network, by increasing the coverage of different knowledge fields and by taking over 
important coordination tasks.  
 
Obviously, claiming that innovation policies’ concern should only be about the 
creation of innovation networks and the strengthening of linkages among actors 
within an economy would not be a sufficient guideline for the struggle with 
evolutionary inefficiencies. Innovation networks are complex organisational forms 
whose structures are subject to significant changes in time. Structures which are 
beneficial in exploratory phases might turn out as obstacles in the exploitative stages 
of the innovation process and vice versa. In the literature indicators from graph theory 
and social network analysis like the centrality of actors in networks, the average path 
length among actors, the density of networks etc. are discussed which describe 
particular occurrences of network structures and their meaning for the functioning of 
innovation networks (see Buchmann and Pyka, 2011 for a survey).  
 
An example will help to illustrate these network dynamics: Saviotti and Catherine 
(2008), for instance, analyze time series of innovation networks in the bio-
pharmaceutical industries and found characteristic patterns in density and centrality 
indicators which, because of the strong innovative performance in these industries, 
might be considered as exemplary for other knowledge intensive industries. In the 
early exploratory phases of the industries the observed networks are characterized 
by a decreasing density. The networks are joined by a growing number of firms which 
bring in their specialised knowledge, thereby increasing the variety of knowledge 
fields accessible in the network for exploration activities. The linkages in this growing 
innovation network, however, are not frequent and therefore its density decreases 
(see fig. 1). In exploitative stages, when the knowledge base in the innovation 
network already matures to some extent, the network stops to grow and instead the 
linkages among actors become much more frequent, i.e. the density of the network 
increases again (see fig. 1). This increasing density indicates strong knowledge 
transfers among actors in order to increase the efficiency of an innovation process 
along a well-defined technological trajectory in the exploitative stage.  
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Figure 1: Decreasing and increasing network densities during the industry-life-cycle 
 
In a similar vein, the centrality in the network, an indicator which measures the 
distribution of linkages among actors, varies systematically (see fig. 2). In early 
explorative stages, centrality measures are small, indicating a more or less equal 
distribution of network activities. In later stages, however, the centrality is strongly 
increasing and the innovation networks even show to some extent scale-free 
attributes (Barabasi and Albert, 1999). The reason for this change is to be seen in the 
two different populations of firms which basically create the innovation networks in 
bio-pharmaceuticals, namely small start-up companies specialised in a small subset 
of biotechnology competences and large pharmaceutical companies with large and 
diversified knowledge bases. The large pharmaceuticals entertain a lot of cooperative 
relationships with the small companies in the exploitation stage, whereas each small 
company generally has only a small number of linkages in the network. In the early 
explorative stages of the industry life cycles such differences do not appear. 
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Figure 2: Increasing network centralities during the industry-life-cycle 
 
The example illustrates that the structures and dynamics of innovation networks are 
characterized by specific patterns which are observable through a number of 
indicators describing networks. In a process-oriented perspective, innovation policy 
can infer from these indicators and their development during the life-cycle of a certain 
industry to decide whether and how to intervene in order to avoid potential network 
inefficiencies. In the early explorative stages of a technology, technological variety 
can be considered more important than dense relationships within the innovation 
network. If the entry rate in the network starts to decrease, innovation policy is asked 
to intervene and to create conditions which allow for a broadening of the underlying 
knowledge base. Similarly, in exploitation stages a stagnant network density might 
indicate that the industry has difficulties in developing a dominant design. In this 
case, innovation policies focussing on increasing relationships within the network will 
support the creation of common standards and norms and thereby emphasize and 
accelerate industry evolution. In the first case innovation policy will avoid exploration 
inefficiencies by taking care of the network inefficiencies; also balance inefficiencies 
which might stem from a too early lock-in into a certain technology or by the ‘not-
invented-in-the-network’ phenomenon, are avoided. In the latter case exploitation 
inefficiencies are avoided by smoothing out network inefficiencies. 
 
Because of the unavoidable true uncertainty in innovation processes, failure cannot 
be excluded and accompanies firms as well as policy actors. In particular, to identify 
the passage from exploration to exploitation activities causes severe difficulties and 
unique patterns in the evolution of the innovation networks are not to be expected. 
 20
Nevertheless, by focussing on innovation processes instead of well-specified 
innovative outcomes and by observing the development of the underlying innovation 
network structures, potential evolutionary inefficiencies are figured out in time and 
allows for counter steering of innovation policy. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In practical innovation policy an increasing focus on innovation networks cannot be 
neglected. Although popular in application, the rational for innovation networks as 
well as their evaluation is not clear from a theoretical perspective. We argue that the 
focus on market-failure is not applicable in innovation policy because of the true 
uncertainty of innovation processes. Therefore, innovation policy has to apply a much 
more modest rationale which abandons the possibility of optimal solutions and 
instead takes care to avoid situations which hamper economic development.  
 
Because of the outstanding importance of innovation networks in the organization of 
R&D processes, they offer a promising starting point for a process-oriented 
innovation policy. Network inefficiencies are superimposed to other evolutionary 
inefficiencies and therefore are to be considered as a primary target for innovation 
policy. In this perspective, the structures and dynamics of innovation networks 
become the focus of attention as well as the starting point of action in innovation 
policy. 
 
Obviously, such an innovation policy requires substantial information on the 
innovation networks, their architectures and their dynamics. So far, only limited 
knowledge on specific patterns of innovation network dynamics is available. 
Furthermore, unique patterns which easily can be drawn upon to deviate suited 
actions of innovation policy are not to be expected because of sectoral and 
technological specificities.  From this follows for the future research agenda, to 
emphasize the empirical research on innovation networks, to create new data bases 
on innovation networks and to improve the indicators for the analysis of complex 
innovation networks. 
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